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Abstract 
 
 Intractable disputes about withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from 
adults who lack capacity are rare but challenging.  Judicial resolution may be needed in 
some of these cases. 
 A central concept for judicial (and clinical) decision-making in this area is a patient’s 
“best interests”. Yet what this term means is contested. 
 There is an emerging Australian Supreme Court jurisprudence that sheds light on when 
life-sustaining treatment will, or will not, be judged to be in a patient’s best interests. 
 Treatment that is either futile or overly burdensome is not in a patient’s best interests. 
Although courts will consider patient and family wishes, they have generally deferred to 
the views of medical practitioners about treatment decisions.  
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Text 
 
Introduction 
What should doctors do if they cannot reach agreement with a family about life-sustaining 
treatment for an adult who lacks decision-making capacity? Effective conflict resolution 
strategies generally resolve these disputes and intractable conflict is rare (1-3).  But they are 
stressful when they occur for clinicians, families and patients.  Health professionals can 
experience moral distress from such cases, with significant personal and professional impact (1, 
4). In such cases, or where there are concerns about the lawfulness of proposed conduct, medical 
practitioners or their hospital may need to seek the opinion of a court or tribunal (1, 5, 6). 
Concerned family members may themselves seek judicial intervention to ensure continued 
treatment.  
How do courts and tribunals respond to end-of-life conflict?  Although all Australian States and 
Territories have adult guardianship tribunals (7), Supreme Courts retain an important role in this 
field.  They have jurisdiction to resolve these disputes and their decisions provide authoritative 
guidance for guardianship tribunals and clinicians in their deliberations.  The test applied by 
Supreme Courts is whether the proposed treatment is in the patient’s “best interests” and this term 
(or analogous concepts) is also part of the criteria applied by guardianship tribunals (7).  Yet, 
what “best interests” means is contested (8, 9).  In this paper, we identify six key themes from the 
developing body of Australian Supreme Court jurisprudence about life-sustaining treatment 
decisions for adults who lack capacity (Box 1).   
Box 1: Six key themes from Supreme Courts’ jurisprudence of “best interests” for decisions 
about life-sustaining treatment for adults who lack capacity 
1. Futile medical treatment is not in a patient’s best interests. 
2. Treatment that is overly burdensome is not in a patient’s best interests. This may be so even 
if the patient is unconscious or unaware of treatment burdens. 
3. Courts have generally not engaged expressly in quality of life assessments but they remain 
relevant for determining best interests when considering the patient’s medical condition and 
prognosis. 
4. A patient’s wishes and values (gleaned when the patient was competent) are relevant to, but 
do not determine, his or her best interests. Family members’ views may also be relevant 
where they are reflecting a patient’s wishes, and perhaps also when reflecting their own 
wishes, but these views do not determine a patient’s best interests. 
5. The interests of other people and organisations (including the wider health system) are 
generally not relevant when determining a patient’s best interests. 
6. Courts have generally deferred to the views of medical practitioners about treatment 
decisions, even in the face of strong opposition from the patient’s family. 
Australian Supreme Court case law concerning end-of-life decisions 
We are aware of only 16 Australian Supreme Court decisions on whether life-sustaining 
treatment should be withheld and/or withdrawn from an adult who lacks capacity.  Of these 16, 
the issue of best interests was directly relevant in eight cases.  The other eight cases focused on 
issues such as the validity of an advance directive and interpretation of guardianship legislation.   
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The eight cases involving a determination of best interests (Box 2) were thematically analysed to 
determine trends in judicial reasoning. Most cases involved proposed withdrawal of treatment. 
The law generally treats withholding and withdrawing treatment as equivalent (10). However, it 
is possible that situations involving withdrawal are more likely to lead to family conflict since 
decisions to stop treating, as opposed to not offering treatment, are more apparent and may 
appear to families to be more causally connected to death (11). 
Box 2: Supreme Court cases on best interests and life-sustaining treatment for adults who 
lack capacity 
Application of Justice Health; re a Patient (2011) 80 NSWLR 354 (Justice Health) 
The NSW Supreme Court declared that life-sustaining treatment for a prisoner who had end-stage 
lung cancer, lacked capacity and was expected to live for only a matter of days or weeks was  
futile and need not be given. 
Slaveski v Austin Health [2010] VSC 493 (Slaveski) 
The Victorian Supreme Court held that continuing artificial ventilation for a 71-year-old man, 
who had suffered a catastrophic stroke and remained in a coma, was burdensome and not in the 
man’s best interests. The medical team did not need to provide treatment despite family requests. 
Australian Capital Territory v JT (2009) 4 ACTLR 68 (JT) 
The ACT Supreme Court held that artificial nutrition and hydration was not futile for a 69-year-
old man who suffered from a psychiatric illness manifesting in religious obsessions which led to 
extreme fasting. The Court declined to make the declaration sought by the government that it 
would be lawful to stop this treatment. 
Melo v Superintendent of Royal Darwin Hospital (2007) 21 NTLR 197 (Melo) 
The NT Supreme Court held that treatment for a 29-year-old man, who had sustained catastrophic 
injuries in a motor vehicle accident, including high-level fractures of the cervical cord and brain 
damage, was futile. It did not require continued treatment despite family requests. 
In the Matter of Herrington; Re King [2007] VSC 151 (Herrington) 
The Victorian Supreme Court declined to order that active treatment (including the administration 
of fluids) be continued for a woman who suffered hypoxic brain damage and had been in a 
vegetative state for six months. It held that the medical team should progress with palliative care 
despite family request for more active treatment.  
Queensland v Astill (unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Muir J, 18 January 2006) 
(Astill) 
The Queensland Supreme Court ordered blood transfusions be given to a woman who was injured 
in a motor vehicle accident despite her possessing a “no blood” card.  This card did not comply 
with formalities of Queensland legislation and so did not operate. Treatment was ordered to 
promote the patient’s welfare. 
Messiha v South East Health [2004] NSWSC 1061 (Messiha) 
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The NSW Supreme Court held that active treatment for a 75-year-old man, who suffered severe 
brain damage after he collapsed at home and his brain was deprived of oxygen for 25 minutes, 
was futile, burdensome and intrusive and should not be continued. The Court did not accept the 
family’s view that treatment was in the patient’s best interests. 
Northridge v Central Sydney Area Health Service (2000) 50 NSWLR 549 (Northridge) 
The NSW Supreme Court reinstated active treatment for a man who suffered brain damage 
following a drug overdose and was in a “chronic vegetative state”. The Court held that 
withdrawing treatment was premature, contrary to the hospital’s own guidance, and not in the 
patient’s best interests.  
Theme 1: Futile treatment is not in a patient’s best interests 
The concept of “futility” is contested (12, 13) and we do not add to that debate here, but instead 
highlight the link made in judgements between futility and best interests. In three of the eight 
decisions (Melo, Herrington and Messiha), the court explicitly stated that where treatment is 
futile, it would not be in the patient’s best interests to commence or continue with it.  In two of 
these cases (Melo and Herrington), the court did not explain why the treatment was futile. 
Instead, the medical practitioners’ assessments of futility were relied upon to inform the best 
interests assessment. In the third case (Messiha), it was held that treatment would be futile 
because continuation of life-sustaining measures gave no real prospect of recovery. 
Two other cases also shed light on the role of futility in these deliberations.  The Court in Justice 
Health stated that active treatment was futile because it would “achieve no more than a short 
prolongation of life without quality” and therefore did not need to be provided.  By contrast, in 
JT, the Court found that treatment was not futile (the patient was not dying) and so it would not 
authorise non-treatment.  
The courts have expressed the view that futile treatment will not be in a patient’s best interests 
(14). But what justifies labelling treatment as futile? Courts have generally relied heavily upon 
medical determinations of futility.  So despite ongoing debate regarding this concept, medical 
opinion is important to judicial determinations. 
Theme 2: Overly burdensome treatment is not in a patient’s best interests 
In the end-of-life setting, decisions may be made to commence or continue invasive forms of 
treatment such as assisted ventilation or to progress to palliative treatment. The courts have held 
that life-sustaining treatment that creates excessive burdens for a patient, relative to possible 
benefits, is not in the patient’s best interests (Slaveski). This includes considering potential pain 
or indignity the patient may suffer through receiving treatment (Herrington).  Treatment may still 
be burdensome even where the patient is unconscious and unaware of these burdens (Messiha).  
Theme 3: Quality of life considerations are relevant 
“Quality of life” considerations have not been explicitly acknowledged by the Supreme Court as 
relevant to patients’ best interests, apart from a brief mention in one case: Justice Health 
(cardiopulmonary resuscitation “would achieve no more than a short prolongation of life without 
quality”). Nevertheless, in the remaining seven cases we contend that quality of life has been 
relevant when assessing best interests.  This has at least occurred implicitly through an 
examination of a person’s prognosis as part of a best interests assessment.  
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To illustrate, in the four cases where treatment was withheld or withdrawn, the patients had 
profound brain injury with no prospect, or very little prospect, of neurological recovery (Slaveski, 
Melo, Herrington and Messiha). By contrast, the three remaining cases where life-sustaining 
treatment was commenced or continued, all involved patients in better neurological states 
(Northridge, JT and Astill).  Although not couched in terms of quality of life, the capacity to 
engage meaningfully with the world seems to be relevant. It appears that, at least indirectly, 
judges consider how the proposed treatment will affect quality of life.  
Theme 4: Views and wishes of the patient are relevant [but not determinative] (and perhaps 
those of family too) 
When assessing a patient’s best interests, the courts have given some consideration to the views 
and wishes of the patient and family members.  This was given at least some attention in three 
cases, although such views were not influential on the courts’ final conclusions. 
In Astill, a woman’s “no blood” advance directive failed because it did not comply with 
formalities required by Queensland legislation. The Court still considered her views but 
concluded there was no evidence to suggest that they remained current when the case was heard. 
Further blood transfusions were authorised despite the previous directive.  In Herrington, the 
Supreme Court considered the views expressed by the patient (which were communicated to the 
Court by the patient’s partner), stating that she would have wanted continued treatment. 
Ultimately, however, treatment was universally regarded by the medical evidence as futile and so 
was not provided. In JT, the Court acknowledged the patient’s views as a relevant factor, but they 
were disregarded because they were “the product of delusional and irrational thought”. 
The cases also demonstrate several ways that the views and wishes of family members can be 
considered in the best interests assessment. First, family can provide information relating to the 
patient’s values or wishes about proposed treatment and this occurred in Herrington and Astill. 
Second, family members may have their own views about the patient’s best interests. In Astill, the 
judge observed that he had taken into account views expressed by all family members when 
determining the patient’s welfare. The other seven cases did not formally acknowledge the views 
of family members as being directly relevant to the best interests assessment, however, some 
made reference to family views and/or preferences (Slaveski, Melo, Herrington, Messiha and 
Northridge).  Finally, family members have expressed views to the court about the patient’s level 
of responsiveness and awareness of their surroundings. Thus, in some cases, the family has 
challenged the medical prognosis to suggest that the patient has responded or engaged in a way 
that indicates an improved state. In all such cases, the court preferred the views of the medical 
team, concluding that continued treatment was not in the patient’s best interests (Melo, 
Herrington and Messiha). 
Theme 5: The interests of others are not relevant 
The court has not regarded the interests of others (aside from the potential relevance of the views 
of the family members outlined above) as being relevant to the best interests assessment. For 
example, in Northridge, the Court observed that “the exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction 
should not be for the benefit of others … including a health care system that is intent on saving 
on costs”. Similarly, in JT, the potential distress to health professionals from providing forced 
treatment did not influence the assessment of what was in the patient’s best interests.  
Theme 6: Judicial deference to medical profession 
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The Supreme Court has usually deferred to medical opinion when assessing best interests. In 
many instances, the courts did not question the conclusion reached by medical practitioners that 
treatment was futile. It should be emphasised, however, that the final assessment does rest with 
the court (a point emphasised in Messiha). And in Northridge, medical decision-making was 
found not to be clinically justified, and the NSW Supreme Court was critical of the medical 
opinion provided. But this case aside, there is clear judicial deference to medical opinion in 
assessing best interests. 
Conclusion 
The end-of-life jurisprudence of Australian Supreme Courts is still developing, but there is 
enough case law to provide useful guidance about assessing best interests.  This guidance is 
significant both for future Supreme Court decisions and those made by guardianship tribunals.  
And although only a minority of cases require judicial intervention, legal considerations 
remain relevant for the larger group of difficult decisions that occur each day since medical 
decisions are made in the “shadow of the law” (15).  Our analysis highlights the themes that 
emerge from judicial decisions.  Although every situation has unique circumstances, these 
factors may be useful for medical practitioners contemplating withdrawing or withholding 
treatment from incompetent adult patients.   
A best interests assessment not to treat can be justified at law if there is a clear basis for 
deciding treatment is futile (despite this term’s subjectivity) (theme 1), or if the patient is 
extremely unlikely to recover consciousness (theme 3).  Treatments that are particularly 
invasive or burdensome relative to their benefits will also not be in a patient’s best interests 
(theme 2).  Decisions should take account of patient views, where known (theme 4), and those 
of family members.  Finally, where a medical view concludes treatment should not be 
provided, this is likely to be supported by the court, but it should be corroborated, for 
example, with a second opinion (theme 6). 
 
 
  
References 
 
1. NSW Health. Conflict Resolution in End of Life Settings (CRELS): Final 
CRELS Project Working Group Report 2010. Sydney: NSW Health. 
http://www0.health.nsw.gov.au/pubs/2010/pdf/conflict_resolution.pdf(accesse
d May 2014).  
2. Bloche MG. Managing conflict at the end of life. N Engl J Med 2005; 352(23): 
2371-2373. 
3. Luce JM. A history of resolving conflicts over end-of-life care in intensive 
care units in the United States. Crit Care Med 2010; 38(8): 1623-1629.  
4. Davidson JE, Powers K, Hedayat KM. et al. Clinical practice guidelines for 
support of the family in the patient-centred intensive care unit: American 
College of Critical Care Medicine Task Force 2004-2005. Crit Care Med 
2007; 35(2): 605-622. 
5. Hillman K, Chen J. Conflict resolution in end of life treatment decisions: An 
evidence check review brokered by the Sax Institute for the NSW Department 
of Health. Sydney: NSW Department of Health 2008. 
http://www.health.nsw.gov.au/research/Documents/14-conflict-resolution-end-
of-life.pdf (accessed May 2014). 
6. Faunce TA, Stewart C. The Messiha and Schiavo cases: third-party ethical and 
legal interventions in futile care disputes. Med J Aust 2005; 183(5): 261-263. 
7. Willmott L, White B, Then S-N. Adults who lack capacity: Substitute 
decision-making.  In: White B, McDonald F, Willmott L, editors. Health Law 
in Australia. Sydney: Thomson, 2010. 
8. Martin W, Freyenhagen F, Hall E, et al. An unblinkered view of best interests. 
BMJ 2012; 345:e8007. 
9. Dunn MC, Clare ICH, Holland AJ, et al. Constructing and Reconstructing 
“Best Interests”: An Interpretative Examination of Substitute Decision‐making 
under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Journal of Social Welfare and Family 
Law 2007; 29(2): 117-133. 
10. Wilkinson D, Savulescu J. A Costly Separation Between Withdrawing and 
Withholding Treatment in Intensive Care. Bioethics 2012. doi: 
10.1111/j.1467-8519.2012.01981.x. [Epub ahead of print]. 
11. Way J, Back AL, Curtis JR. Withdrawing life support and resolution of 
conflict with families. BMJ 2002; 325(7376): 1342–1345. 
12. Helft PR, Siegler M, Lantos J. The rise and fall of the futility movement. N 
Engl J Med 2000; 343(4): 293–296. 
13. Wilkinson DJ, Savulescu J. Knowing when to stop: futility in the ICU. Curr 
Opin Anaesthesiol 2011; 24(2): 160-165.  
14. Willmott L, White B, Downie J. Withholding and withdrawal of “futile” life-
sustaining treatment: unilateral medical decision-making in Australia and New 
Zealand. J Law Med 2013; 20(4): 907-924. 
15. Pope TM, Waldman EA. Mediation at the End of Life: Getting Beyond the 
Limits of the Talking Cure. Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 2007; 
23(1): 143. 
